Answer per control. Each answer feeds the evaluation and the traceability chain Actor → Vector → Component → Effect → Audit.
Are sonar / acoustic / EM sensor outputs cryptographically bound to their source device?
Sweep results and contact reports drive operational decisions; a forged sonar frame could falsely declare an area clear. Cryptographically binding sensor frames to the originating device (signed at the sensor, verified at the consumer) prevents in-line tampering.
Is the magnetic/acoustic generator command path isolated from general IT networks?
Influence sweep generators output high-power magnetic/acoustic fields. If their command path is reachable from general IT, a compromised laptop could trigger them at the wrong place or time. Strict network segmentation and one-way data diodes where possible are required.
Are acoustic comms authenticated, rate-limited, and monitored for injection?
Underwater acoustic channels (incl. NATO JANUS) are inherently broadcast, low-bandwidth and prone to injection. Authentication, rate-limiting and anomaly monitoring prevent an attacker on a small boat from issuing commands or replaying captured frames.
Are launch/recovery and manned↔unmanned handover protected by physical and logical interlocks?
Launch-and-recovery and the manned↔unmanned handover are the moments where a wrong command can injure crew or damage the platform. Physical interlocks (mechanical) and logical interlocks (software state machine) together must make unsafe sequences impossible, not just discouraged.
Are mechanical sweep actuators driven via an isolated control path with independent emergency stop?
Even mechanical sweep equipment (cable cutters, paravanes) is now electrically actuated. A dedicated control path with an independent emergency-stop that physically breaks power ensures the equipment can be stopped even if the main control computer is compromised.
Are mine-setting, target-simulation and mine-jamming modes protected by signed mission profiles and operator dual-control?
Mine-setting, target-simulation and mine-jamming are operations with strategic consequences if misused. Signed mission profiles ensure only authorized parameter sets run, and dual-operator approval prevents a single rogue or coerced operator from issuing them.
Is collected mission data (sweep tracks, contacts, sensor logs) sealed and chain-of-custody preserved on return?
Mission data (sweep tracks, sonar contacts, sensor logs) is evidence — both for operational debrief and for any later forensic or legal review. Sealing with hashes on return and maintaining chain-of-custody prevents undetected modification or accusations of tampering.
Is the degaussing / magnetic signature subsystem isolated from external networks and tamper-monitored?
Degaussing and magnetic-signature management subsystems both influence the platform's own detectability and are attractive sabotage targets. Network isolation plus tamper sensors ensure changes are intentional and detected.
